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Abstract
In recent times, parliaments of all Swiss state levels have had to deal with demands for
alternate members. The hope is that allowing alternate members will, on the one hand,
make it easier for members of parliament to reconcile politics, family and work and
thus ultimately save the militia system. On the other hand, it addresses the question
of whether empty seats can represent at all and what can be done if elected repre-
sentatives are frequently or long absent. In practice, parliaments allowing alternates
are rather rare. Nevertheless, rules vary considerably with regard to the mode of se-
lection and the rights and duties of the alternates as well as the conditions that allow
alternation. Neither these rules as such nor the underlying concepts of representation
have, however, been investigated in political science to date. This contribution uses
a comparative case study approach to compare the regulations for parliamentary al-
ternates in two Swiss cantons (Graubünden, Valais) and Liechtenstein, and creates a
typology to show which concepts of representation they reect and to what extent
they contribute to the realization of the respective. Furthermore, this typology will
enable the investigation of empirical questions relating both to the composition and
functioning of parliaments and to the behavior and political positions of individual
representatives.
Keywords: alternate members of parliament, descriptive representation, substantial rep-
resentation, Swiss cantons, Liechtenstein, comparative case study
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1 Introduction
In recent times, representative democracy has been seen to stand increasingly under pressure.
The more and more individualistic society can hardly be represented in a way that takes into ac-
count all possible life circumstances. As a result, many people do not feel represented in politics
and complaints are being voiced that the will of the people is not respected (Rosanvallon 2015;
Dalton 2004; Pitkin 2004). In this respect, it does not exactly foster trust in representative democ-
racy when elected members of parliament (MPs) stay away from parliamentary sessions, be it for
professional, private or other reasons. This is exemplied by the recurring newspaper headlines
about which member of the Swiss Federal Assembly currently holds the slightly dubious title
“absentee king” (e.g. Braun 2019; Marjanovic 2019; NZZ 2019; Züriost 2019; Renz 2014; 1815.ch
2013). In and of themselves, absences from parliament have the potential to decisively shift the
balance of political power, raising doubts about the representativeness of decisions (Golder and
Huth 2019). Especially in the context of the Corona pandemic, this aspect has lately received
attention in the political debate.1
At the same time, the militia system is reaching its limits. Diculties in recruiting political
personnel are common. The question arises as to who can aord to actively engage in politics
at all and who succeeds in reconciling politics with family and professional career, respectively.
What is more, the ongoing professionalization of parliaments along with the reduction in the
number of seats – which has been implemented in several Swiss cantons over the past decades
– has increased the workload for MPs signicantly (Freitag et al. 2019; Bundi et al. 2018; Vatter
2002). Diculties in reconciling politics, family and professional career also regularly cause MPs
to resign, increasing the need for political personnel even further (Feh Widmer 2015).
The possibility that an alternate can take the seat of an absent MP increases the exibility of
the parliamentary mandate and therewith has a twofold potential to take away pressure from
representative (militia) democracy: On the one hand, democratic representation is vulnerable
when parliamentary seats remain empty because one or more MPs (have to) stay away from a
session. Supposedly, an absentee does not represent their voters in parliament, resulting in a
perceived representation decit. Moreover, the inherent potential for decisive shifts in political
power cause decisions to be mistrusted. Allowing alternates can directly alleviate these symptoms
by raring empty seats. On the other hand, the militia system is under pressure because high bar-
riers in terms of accessibility and reconcilability of a parliamentary mandate with professional
and family responsibilities block the way to parliament for a non-negligible part of the popula-
tion, thereby shrinking the pool of potential candidates. Allowing alternates can indirectly break
down these barriers, partly at least, and make it easier or even possible for people from various
social groups to sit in parliament. This in turn can be conducive to the parliament’s perceived
1 The argument has been made, for example, by the National Council’s Political Institutions Committee as justication
for allowing National Coucil members who are in quarantine or isolation to cast their vote from home. See Pa.Iv.
20.483 (SPK-NR) “Nationalratsmitglieder, die wegen der Covid-19-Krise verhindert sind. Teilnahme an Abstimmungen
in Abwesenheit”.
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representativeness, strengthening trust in the system (Rosanvallon 2015; Dovi 2002; Mansbridge
2016). Can alternate members of parliament thus revitalize representative (militia) democracy?2
This paper makes a rst step towards answering this question. Of course, it is a long way to
go and the rst step is small but fundamental. In that sense, the paper examines the theoretical
relationship between dierent implementation options for parliamentary alternates and repre-
sentation. Hence, it focuses the following research question: How are existing regulations for
parliamentary alternates designed and which concepts of representation do they reect? By means
of a comparative case study, a typology of such regulations and their representation-specic fea-
tures shall be elaborated.
To this end, the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a denition of parliamentary
alternates along with an overview of the ongoing discussion about alternate MPs on all Swiss
state levels as well as in the literature. Section 3 sheds light on representation theory and explains
the relevant concepts, before the selected cases are described in Section 4. The resulting typology
that connects the described alternates systems with their underlying representation concepts is
presented in Section 5. The paper concludes with a discussion and further research agenda.
2 Parliamentary alternates: an ongoing debate but scientific
blind spot
In the rst place, it must be claried how alternate members of parliament are dened for the
purpose of this study. The aim of alternate MPs is to temporally replace a regular MP, whereby
the regular MP in principle keeps the mandate. The alternate takes over in case the regular MP
is unable to attend one or more parliamentary sittings. After the end of the absence, the regular
MP resumes their seat in parliament, with the alternate again leaving the chamber. In contrast,
“permanent” replacement, i.e., moving up after a MP has denitively resigned from oce, is
outside the scope of this paper.
Today in Switzerland, ve cantons (Graubünden, Valais, Neuchâtel, Geneva, and Jura) allow
alternates in the above sense to their cantonal parliaments, as does the small neighbor state
Liechtenstein to its national legislative. Although subject of an ongoing debate, particularly with
regard to female MPs and maternity, this is not at all a new idea. Already in the 19th century,
the Swiss cantons Graubünden and Valais had regulations concerning alternate MPs (Vuignier
2011). Generally, these are still in force today. Liechtenstein adopted a system of alternates for
its national parliament in 1939, at the same time as it changed to proportional representation
(Beck 2013). To this day, the Swiss cantons of Jura (1977), Neuchâtel (2000) and Geneva (2012)
have followed suit in introducing alternate MPs (Vuignier 2011; Assemblée constituante de la
République et Canton de Genève 2012).
2 This hope has also been used as justication in parliamentary initiatives to introduce an alternates system for the
Swiss National Council. See for example Pa.Iv. 07.466 (Markwalder) “Suppleantensystem für den Nationalrat”; Pa.Iv.
19.492 (Fiala) “Milizsystem unter Druck. Tragfähige Lösungen nden”.
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During the past decade, demands for alternate members accumulated in parliaments of all
Swiss state levels. In addition to the Federal Assembly3, the cantonal legislatives of Zurich4, Bern5,
Lucerne6, Glarus7, Basel-Stadt8, Basel-Landschaft9, and Aargau10, as well as the communal leg-
islatives of Zurich11, Bern12, Lucerne13, and St. Gallen14 had to deal with corresponding requests.
Apart from the canton of Aargau, where the cantonal parliament charged the government with
elaborating a legal basis for alternate MPs in cases of maternity (Mo. [AG] 19.118), however, no
concrete steps towards the introduction of an alternates system have resulted from this so far.
In all other cases, the requests were rejected, are still pending or merely initiated investigations
on the subject.
Recent developments include the new cantonal constitution of Geneva, approved in a popular
vote in 2012, introducing, inter alia, a regulation for alternates in the cantonal parliament (As-
semblée constituante de la République et Canton de Genève 2012). Also the new city charter of
Biel/Bienne, on which the people will presumably vote in 2021, contains a system of alternate
members for the city council (Stadtkanzlei Biel 2020).
Even though such systems are long established in some places and subject of an ongoing debate
in others, they have not been investigated in political science to date. Literature on parliamentary
alternates in the above sense is scarce and mostly shallow. Vuignier (2011) has studied the system
of alternate MPs in Valais, tracing its origins, reviewing the recurrent debates on its reform, and
pointing out persisting practical problems. He does though not make systematic comparisons
with other systems of alternate MPs, nor does he address in depth the opportunities and risks of
such a system for democratic representation. Those have been explored by Golder et al. (2018),
and Golder and Huth (2019), however, on the case of the new city charter of Biel/Bienne. In a rep-
resentative survey as well as in focus group discussions, the population was given the opportunity
to comment on the idea (still new in Biel/Bienne) of an alternates system for the city council, to
address hoped-for advantages and feared risks, and to express wishes for the concrete design of
3 Po. 18.4370 (Kälin) “Ersatz für Parlamentarierinnen und Parlamentarier bei Mutterschaft, Vaterschaft und längerer
Krankheit”; Pa.Iv. 19.492 (Fiala) “Milizsystem unter Druck. Tragfähige Lösungen nden”.
4 Be.Iv. [ZH] 354/2020 “Schaung einer kantonalen Rechtsgrundlage für eine Stellvertretungsregelung in den Gemein-
deparlamenten”; Pa.Iv. [ZH] 420/2020 (Marti) “Stellvertretungsregelung für Zürcher Parlamente”.
5 Mo. [BE] 310-2015 (Dunning) “Stellvertretungsmodell für Kantonsparlamentarierinnen und Kantonsparlamentarier”;
Mo. [BE] 071-2020 (Ammann) “Stellvertretungssystem für den Grossen Rat”; Mo. [BE] 183-2020 (SP-JUSO-PSA) “Mut-
terschaftsvertretung für Grossrätinnen ermöglichen”
6 Mo. [LU] 699 (Estermann) über die Einführung einer Stellvertretungsregelung im Kantonsrat.
7 Mo. [GL] 2020-32 (Vuichard) “Schaung einer gesetzlichen Grundlage für die Stellvertretung im Landrat”.
8 An. [BS] 17.5400 (Wegmann) betreend Stellvertretungssystem im Grossen Rat; An. [BS] 18.5043 (Wegmann) betreend
Stellvertretungssystem bei Elternschaft; Mo. [BS] 18.5437 (Wanner) betreend Stellvertretungsregelung für Mütter
während der Zeit des Mutterschutzes.
9 Vpo. [BL] 2019/477 (Steinemann) “Stellvertretung für Parlamentarier/innen während längerer Abwesenheit”.
10 Po. [AG] 19.105 (Mallien) betreend Wahl von Suppleanten (Verminderung von Zufallsentscheiden des Parlaments
wegen Abwesenheiten von Grossräten); Mo. [AG] 19.118 (Schweri) betreend Stellvertretungsregelung im Grossen Rat
für Mütter während der Zeit des Mutterschutzes und während der Stillzeit, sowie weiteren, beispielsweise unfall- oder
krankheitsbedingten längeren Abwesenheiten; Mo. [AG] 20.58 (Marclay-Merz) betreend Schaung einer gesetzlichen
Grundlage für die Stellvertretungsmöglichkeit in den Einwohnerräten.
11 Beschlussantrag [Stadt Zürich] 2020/256 “Behördeninitiative zur Schaung einer kantonalen Rechtsgrundlage für eine
Stellvertretungsregelung in den Gemeindeparlamenten”.
12 Mo. [Stadt Bern] 2020.SR.000233 (Esseiva) “Stellvertretungsregelung im Stadtrat”.
13 Mo. [Stadt Luzern] 82 (Bucher) “Stellvertretungssystem im Grossen Stadtrat einführen”; Po. [Stadt Luzern] 262 (Stud-
halter) “Parlamentarische Arbeit auch während Mutterschutz ermöglichen”.
14 Ip. Yvonne Joos [Stadt St. Gallen] “Urlaub mit Vertretung bei Mutterschaft und anderen längeren Absenzen”.
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the regulation. Comparisons of the existing regulations for alternates in Swiss cantonal parlia-
ments hitherto limit themselves to listing a few key values, are not systematic, and refrain from
drawing any conclusions regarding representation (Assemblée constituante de la République et
Canton de Genève 2010; Golder and Huth 2019; Präsidium Stadtparlament Stadt St. Gallen 2013;
Ratsbüro des Grossen Rats des Kantons Basel-Stadt 2019; Regierungsrat des Kantons Basel-Stadt
2019; Schiess Rütimann 2016; Stadlin 1990; Tschirren 2019).
3 Theoretical background: different concepts of representation
Representation literature is very broad and oers myriad denitions, perspectives, and explana-
tions. There are no short and simple answers to questions like: What is (good) representation?
What does representing mean? Who must a representative be and what must they do in order to
represent well? Yet these are the issues that must be addressed when investigating the relation-
ship between parliamentary alternates regulations and representation.
This paper uses Hanna Pitkins “Concept of Representation” (1972) as a baseline. It distinguishes
four understandings of representation that will be shortly described in the following. Generally,
Pitkin (ibid.: 8) denes representation in the literal sense (from latin: re-praesentare) as “mak-
ing present again”. This making present of something or someone absent is the core, spirit and
purpose of representation and can be achieved in dierent ways. Formally, representation can
be established through authorization (i.e., a transfer of decision-making power or “the giving
of authority to act”, ibid.: 11) and through imposing accountability (i.e., the possibility to termi-
nate this relationship). What is more, to represent can mean to stand for something or someone,
either through objective resemblance (i.e., the idea of mirroring or “reecting without distor-
tion”, ibid.: 60) or through subjective responses like “being-believed-in or accepted-as a symbol”
(ibid.: 104). Lastly, to represent can be understood as a substantial activity, as “an acting for
others” (ibid.: 12). Turning to the research question of which understandings of representation
underlie the given regulations for parliamentary alternates, two of the four concepts of Pitkin’s
are of particular relevance.
First, descriptive representation addresses the question what somebody or something has
to be like in order to be considered representative. From the descriptive point of view, repre-
senting means “giving information about the represented” (ibid.: 83). A representative has to be
“suciently like” (ibid.: 80) the represented. This encompasses for instance the notion “that a
legislature is like a map or mirror, [. . .], that it reects or resembles the nation by its composi-
tion” (ibid.: 81). Accordingly, good representation means “giving accurate information” (ibid.: 83,
author’s emphasis) and in this sense, representation can be better or worse, as the reection
can be more or less accurate. For example, a young woman can represent “the young women”
because she is a young woman herself, or a farmer represents “the farmers” because he is one
himself. Yet the averagely educated young woman or the farmer with an averagely large farm
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are probably seen to be more representative of their respective group as the young professor
(of all young women) or the hobby farmer who keeps ve goats (of all farmers). Thus, from a
descriptive perspective, whether a representative is a good or legitimate representative is mea-
sured by who they are or what characteristics they have. It matters rst and foremost who is
present or participating in political processes (Dovi 2015; Phillips 1998).
Second, substantial representation addresses the question what someone has to do in order
to represent. From the substantial point of view, representing means acting for the represented
in the sense of “‘to act in the interest of’ or ‘to act according to the wishes of’” the represented
(Pitkin 1972: 208). As long as the representative acts “on behalf of” (Dovi 2015) the represented,
it is irrelevant for representation who the representative is. It is understood that a man can
also substantially represent “the women” as long as he acts in their interest and advocates for
women’s rights, for example. It follows, of course, that substantial representation can also be
better or worse, depending on how well the representative promotes the interests of the rep-
resented. From a substantial perspective, it matters rst and foremost “whose preferences and
whose interests are advanced” (ibid.).
In contrast, formal representation concerns when or under what conditions something is con-
sidered representation, representative or representing at all. A representation relationship re-
quires that the representative is authorized to act in the name of the represented and that they
can be held accountable for their actions by the represented. In this respect, representation can-
not be assessed as good or bad, because either these conditions are met or they are not. In the
context of representative democracy, formal representation can therefore rather be seen as a
precondition for (democratic) legitimacy, which is typically guaranteed through elections (Pitkin
1972; Dovi 2015). Naturally an on/o feature, it cannot provide guidelines for how a system is to
be designed in order to implement a specic idea of representation at the best. The formalistic
view is therefore not taken into account for the typology of parliamentary alternates systems.
Neither is symbolic representation because it cannot be legally guaranteed, as it depends en-
tirely on the “emotional, aective, irrational psychological responses” (Pitkin 1972: 100) of the
represented. In other words, symbolic representation is accomplished when “a person feels rep-
resented” (Dovi 2015). This feeling is based on “the beliefs, attitudes, assumptions of people”
(Pitkin 1972: 100) and cannot be evoked by institutional design. “Perhaps symbolic representa-
tion can be brought about by propaganda or coercion”, Pitkin (ibid.: 109) argues, but then it is
no longer democratic but “fascist” (ibid.: 107). Nevertheless, “it is important to ask when people
are satised by their representatives, and under what circumstances they feel they are not be-
ing represented” (ibid.: 110). Yet assessing this lies beyond the scope of this paper and requires
additional research rst, which is planned to be conducted in the future.
Consequentially, this paper intends to distinct regulations for parliamentary alternates in terms
of whether they primarily aim for descriptive or substantial representation. It will be shown in
the following, how the intention to fulll the one or the other is anchored in the design of the
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respective institutions, or rather how the implementation of a specic concept of representation
follows from institutional design choices.
4 Case description
Five Swiss cantons (Graubünden, Valais, Neuchâtel, Geneva, and Jura), and only these ve, allow
alternate members to their cantonal parliaments. This is why they are investigated. The case
of Liechtenstein is added, because it has also a long tradition of parliamentary alternates that
rests on a well-established regulation. Furthermore, Liechtenstein’s alternates system conceptu-
ally diers from the long-established ones in Graubünden and Valais. It has clearly reected
the idea of keeping the political power balance constant and preventing “random decisions”
caused through absences from the beginning (Schiess Rütimann 2016; Beck 2013; Batliner 1981),
whereas the systems in Graubünden and Valais follow a mostly regionalist approach. In the fu-
ture, all six cases (i.e., ve cantons and Liechtenstein) shall be integrated into the comparative
case study. So far, only Graubünden, Valais, and Liechtenstein have been investigated, the others
(Neuchâtel, Geneva, and Jura) are still to follow. Yet also the comparison of the three promises
interesting results.
For each case, numerous criteria have been assessed by means of document analysis, which
group into the following four categories: (1) context, e.g., number of seats in parliament, electoral
system; (2) modus, e.g., determination of the alternates, number of alternates; (3) the conditions
under which an alternate is appointed, e.g., initiation, duration of the replacement; and (4) rights
and duties of the alternates, e.g., parliamentary initiatives/requests, commissions. The most dis-
tinctive features of each case in each category are described in the following.
Liechtenstein
Context: The parliament of Liechtenstein (“Landtag”) consists of 25 members, which are elected
by proportional representation in two electoral districts (art. 46 LV). The militia parliament meets
in nine sessions per year of three days each (Schiess Rütimann 2016: 116). It has a quorum if at
least two thirds of the members are present (art. 58 LV).
Modus: The number of alternates varies between legislative periods and is tied to the respec-
tive election result (Schiess Rütimann 2016: 115). Each party list that wins at least one seat is
entitled to an alternate, to two alternates with at least six seats and to nine alternates with at
least nine seats, that is, one alternate per three regular MPs (art. 46 LV; art. 46 VRG). Determined
as alternates are the rst candidates after the elected on the party list, i.e., the candidates that
received the most votes among the ones not having won a seat (art. 60 VRG).
Conditions: An alternate is appointed when a MP is exceptionally hindered from attendance,
whereby the absence has to be announced and justied in advance (art. 53 LV; art. 23 GOLT;
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Beck 2013: 144). The alternate has to attend at least one whole sitting (i.e., half a day; art. 49 LV;
Bussjäger 2016: § 36; Schiess Rütimann 2016: 117). A maximum number of sittings is not dened,
but there must not be a “permanent impediment” (art. 53 LV). Lawful reasons for absence that
entail the attendance of an alternate are only “important” reasons, either health-related or as a
result of other “unforeseen and unavoidable” events (art. 22–23 GOLT). In practice, no evidence
of the reason of absence is required, however (Beck 2013: 141; Schiess Rütimann 2016: 118). The
speaker of the parliament could though deny to accept a reason put forward, thereby denying the
attendance of an alternate in place of the absent MP (Beck 2013: 146; Schiess Rütimann 2016: 118).
If a party list has more than one alternate MP, their parliamentary group decides which of the
alternates is going to take the place of the absentee (art. 23 GOLT).
Rights and duties of the alternates: Alternates replace an absentee MP in the plenum “with
seat and vote” (art. 49 LV), that is, they take part in the debate, can ask questions and make pro-
posals, and cast their votes (Bussjäger 2016: § 41; Wille 2015: 508). However, they cannot submit
nor co-sign parliamentary initiatives or requests (art. 38 GOLT). Alternates receive the same doc-
uments as the regular MPs and usually attend parliamentary group meetings as well (Schiess
Rütimann 2016: 118). They are obligated to keep themselves informed about the (current) parlia-
mentary aairs as well as about documents, reports and motions in order to be able to intervene
appropriately in the case of their appointment (Beck 2013: 141). For being on standby, alternates
are compensated with half the fee of regular MPs. In addition, they receive the regular meeting
fee for each meeting they attend (Schiess Rütimann 2016: 118). Like regular MPs, alternates are
granted immunity and open mandate, i.e., they vote without instructions (Bussjäger 2016: § 41;
Allgäuer 1989: 44; Schiess Rütimann 2016: 119). Alternates can be directly elected to all parlia-
mentary committees, although they must not be a majority and they cannot chair them (art. 71
GOLT; Wille 2015: 480).
Graubünden
Context: The cantonal parliament of Graubünden (“Grosser Rat”) consists of 120 members,
which are elected by majority vote in 39 electoral districts (art. 27 KV GR). The militia parliament
meets in six sessions per year of three days each (art. 1 GGO GR). It has a quorum if at least half
of the members are present (art. 41 GRG GR).
Modus: The number of alternates is tied to the number of seats in each electoral district. Each
district is entitled to as many alternates as regulary MPs, although not more than ten. The alter-
nates are directly elected on separate lists in an election held in parallel and analogous to the
election of regular MPs (art. 4 GRG GR; Brunner 2006: § 17; Schuler 2006: § 13; Vuignier 2011: 7).
Conditions: An alternate is appointed when a MP is hindered from attending a parliamentary
session (GRG GR: art. 40). The absence of the MP and the attendance of the alternate must be
announced in advance (GGO GR: art. 3). An alternate can only be appointed for a whole session
(i.e., three days) and not for single sittings (art. 40 GRG GR). There is no maximum number of
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sessions an alternate can attend in a row. An objection may be raised against the admission of an
alternate, whereupon the Council shall decide on the matter (art. 40 GRG GR). In case a regular
MP cannot attend the session, the rst alternate (i.e., the one with the most electoral votes) of
the respective district is appointed, and that independently from their party aliation (Stadlin
1990: V).
Rights and duties of the alternates: Alternates replace a regular MP in plenary sessions with
all their rights and duties (art. 40 KV GR; Vuignier 2011: 7). They receive the same documents as
the regular MPs (art. 4 GGO GR). Alternates are not admitted to standing committees, but only to
ad hoc committees (Vuignier 2011: 7).
Valais
Context: The cantonal parliament of Valais (“Grand Conseil” or “Grosser Rat”) consists of 130
members, which are elected by double proportional representation (“Doppelter Pukelsheim”) in
six electoral districts, that are divided into a total of 14 sub-districts (art. 136–136a kGPR VS). The
militia parliament meets in six sessions per year of four days each (art. 62 GORBG VS). It has a
quorum if the majority of the members are present (art. 47 KV VS).
Modus: The number of alternates (“suppleants”) is xed at 130, i.e., there are as many alter-
nates as regular MPs (art. 84 KV VS). The alternates are directly elected on separate lists in an
election held in parallel and analogous to the election of regular MPs (art. 136 kGPR VS).
Conditions: An alternate is appointed when a MP is hindered from attending a parliamentary
sitting (art. 15 GORBG VS). There are no limits to the duration of the replacement, neither in the
minimum nor in the maximum. Although there is one alternate for every one regular MP, there
are not necessarily MP-suppleant pairs. Rather, the absentee appoints an alternate of their choice
(from the 130). Thereby, the appointed alternate need not be from the same district nor from the
same party as the absentee, although the latter is supposed to be uncommon, as the alternates
are usually organized by the parliamentary groups (Stadlin 1990: V; Vuignier 2011: 7).
Rights and duties of the alternates: Alternates replace a regular MP in plenary sessions and,
if necessary, also in commissions. Principally, they have the same rights and duties as the regular
MPs with the exception that they are not eligible for supervisory commissions and cannot chair
a commission. They receive the same documents and the same fees as the regular MPs and vote
without instructions (art. 15 GORBG VS; art. 24 RGR VS; Vuignier 2011: 19).
5 Results: towards a typology of parliamentary alternates
systems
The comparison of the described cases leads to the following key ndings:
Concerning the context criteria, the most important dierence between the three cases is the
9
electoral system. The Liechtenstein parliament is elected in two – measured by the smallness of
the entire political system – large electoral districts, ensuring the representation of all regions of
the country only very roughly. In contrast, both the Graubünden majority vote system and the
Valais double proportional representation system contain a distinctly regionalist component.
Also concerning the modus criteria, the Liechtenstein case diers signicantly from the other
two. In both Graubünden and Valais, a xed number of alternates are elected in each district in
a separate election that is held in parallel with, but otherwise independent of, the election of reg-
ular MPs. It would therefore be theoretically feasible for an alternate to be elected from a party
that does not have a regular MP at all. In the proportional representation system in Valais, this
may be rather unlikly because voters might largely favor the same party for the regular MPs and
alternates lists. But in Graubünden, where the rst-past-the-post electoral system accounts for
far more personality elections, this is absolutely plausible. In the Liechtenstein system, however,
the entitlement to an alternate lies with the party lists. Each list that wins at least one seat is en-
titled to one alternate or, if it wins more than three seats, to one alternate for every three seats.
In this way, the alternates are practically an extension of the parliamentary groups respectively
an expansion of the personnel pool of the parties.
Concerning the conditions under which an alternate is appointed, there are three striking
dierences: Firstly, in the Liechtenstein case, not all absencences imply the appointment of an
alternate. It is actually only permissible in the event that the regular MP is unavoidably physically
prevented from attending and not, for instance, if a regular MP voluntarily stays away from the
meeting because they do not want to conict with their parliamentary group if they do not share
the opinion on a particular matter. At least in law, this is a specity of the Liechtenstein case,
as the Graubünden and Valais systems do not impose any special requirements on the reason
for absence. Secondly, in Graubünden altenates can only be appointed for a whole session, i.e.,
the full three days, while in the other cases they can also be appointed for a single meeting only.
Thirdly, in Liechtenstein and Graubünden it is possible that an alternate is not allowed to attend
because the speaker of the parliament respectively the parliament rejects it. In contrast, such an
objection is not possible in Valais.
Concerning the rights and duties of the alternates, it is to be noted that in none of the three
systems alternates have exactly the same rights as regular MPs. However, the rights and duties
are incongruent in dierent ways. On the one hand, there are dierences in whether and how
alternates are allowed in commissions. On the other hand, the systems dier on the question of
whether alternates can submit or co-sign parliamentary initiatives and requests. The latter is the
case in Graubünden and Valais, but not in Liechtenstein. In return, in Liechtenstein alternates
can be directly elected to all parliamentary commissions, whereas in Graubünden and Valais
they are not admitted to standing or supervisory commissions, respectively.
The comparative results show that dierent regulations for alternate MPs reect dierent con-
10
cepts of representation. The Graubünden system is strongly regionalist, as alternates are tied
to the electoral districts and party aliations do not matter at all. It is decisive where a repre-
sentative comes from, but not what party they belong to. The system ensures above all, that the
alternate has the same origin as the absent MP they replace, and since districts are generally
small, geographic origin is likely also an indicator of social origin in the sense of a common liv-
ing environment. Origin can mean, for example, whether it is an urban or rural environment,
whether it is located high on a mountain or in a valley, which language is spoken there, how the
local society is composed demographically, an so on. These are external characteristics in the
sense that they can be assessed without asking a person about their thoughts. So the system does
not ensure that the alternate advocates the same interests and preferences as the absentee, but
it rather assumes it based on the fact of their common origin. Consequentially, the Graubünden
regulation reects rst and foremost a descriptive representation concept.
In stark contrast, however, is the Liechtenstein system. It designs alternates as an entitlement
of the parties respectively the parliamentary groups. The primary objective of this system is to
keep the political power balance (i.e., the party strengths) constant. Moreover, it ensures that
small parties do not entirely lose their voice when their only MP cannot attend a meeting. Thus,
it aims at guaranteeing above all substantial representation by intending to ensure that all parties
are present in the strength to which they are entitled. The crucial characteristic that the alternate
has in common with the regular MP they replace is interests, preferences and opinions, which
members of the same party are likely to share. Yet it does not matter what external characteristics
the alternate has, i.e., who they are or where they come from.
Lastly, the Valais system is designed very freely and oers a wide margin of maneuver to absent
MPs. Absentees can to some extent decide themselves which alternate they want to appoint and
thereby which understanding of representation they follow. They can appoint an alternate from
their district and/or their party, but they need not do so. Consequently, if the absentee chooses
an alternate of their party, they probably want to ensure that their interests, preferences and
opinions are represented. This corresponds to the realization of a substantive representation
concept. However, they can just as easily opt for descriptive representation, either in choosing
an alternate from the same district with whom they share their origin or even in choosing an
alternate that shares certain socioeconomical traits with them. The latter would be the case, for
example, if a young woman chooses another young woman to replace her or if a farmer chooses
another farmer to replace him. In this respect, the Valais system does not determine a specic
representation concept, but rather oers the opportunity to go for either one.
6 Conclusion, discussion and research agenda
By means of a comparative case study it has been shown that in the Swiss cantons and Liechten-
stein three types of regulations for parliamentary alternates exist: The substantial type ensures
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above all that the alternate has interests, preferences and opinions in common with the absent
MP they replace. It does that by selecting the alternate depending only on their party aliation.
What external characteristics the alternate has, e.g., who they are or where they come from, do
not matter for this type. The descriptive type, in contrast, guarantees above all that the alternate
has certain external characteristics in common with the absent MP they replace. It does that
by selecting the alternate depending only on a specied external characteristic, for example ori-
gin. What interests, preferences and opinions the alternate has, and therewith which party he
belongs to, does not matter at all for this type. The third type is a exible type that allows for
ensuring substantial or descriptive representation either way. It is even thinkable that both or
none of the two is realized, depending entirely on what criteria an absent MP takes into account
when choosing their alternate.
This conclusion is a preliminary one, as the paper is the rst step on the long way to investigate
whether and how parliamentary alternates can take away pressure from representative (militia)
democracy. The typology will in further steps be used to empirically analyze the direct and in-
direct eects of parliamentary alternates, both on representation and the militia system. In this
respect, many pathways are still open, from analyzing parliamentary vote data to interviewing
MPs.
At this point, the paper reects the status quo of a work in progress. So far, only three of six
cases have been investigated, which leaves three to do (Neuchâtel, Geneva, and Jura). What is
more, data was generated entirely through document analysis, leaving many things unclear, as
the documents do not explain how the rules work in practice. In a next step, more substantive
value will be added thereto by conducting qualitative interviews with the relevant persons in the
cantonal administrations. Furthermore, interviews with MPs and alternate MPs will shed light on
how they perceive and/or assess the functioning of the system and the lived practice therein. This
will allow to point out interesting as well as important dierences between the rules in law and
rules in use. In addition, the impacts of the latter will also be investigated quantitatively, for ex-
ample with smartvote15 data from Valais, analyses of parliamentary vote data, and comparisons
of the parliamentary activity of regular MPs and alternates. Moreover, comparing trust levels
across cantons will make it possible to account for the symbolic representation concept, which
has been omitted hitherto. This additional information will then in turn be used to further rene
the typology.
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